Thu 26 Jan 2006
The story of Pixar is the latest example of how differently leaders of todayâs foresighted vs. blind-spotted technology, communications and media goliaths are remaking their converging industries. The contrast between those that can see what almost no one else can and those that have a hard time acting on what nearly everyone can see is playing out in the increasing number of industry acquisitions.
In the case of Pixar, Disney isnât the one showing great foresight here. Current CEO Bob Iger acted on what predecessor Michael Eisner couldnât see through the dense fog of his ego; Disney needs to restore its core animation business and purchasing Pixar, while at a very dear $7.4 billion price, is the best way to do it.
Pixar CEO Steve Jobs showed the foresight in this case, when in 1986 he bought Pixar, then a graphics computing division of Lucasfilm, for $10 million from the Star Wars creator George Lucas and shaped it into the technology driven animation company that Disney had to have.
Who is showing foresight these days? Ironically, foresight is only proven out in hindsight, but GYM (Google, Yahoo and Microsoft) appear to be putting bets down now on a wide range of emerging businesses that may play critical roles not only in the future of these companies but, more importantly, in the direction of the converging technology, communications and media industries.
The relatively new goliaths like GYM (new compared to the Disneys, IBMs, and incumbent telcos of this world) have been acquiring venture backed companies in increasing numbers since the IPO market went nearly dry a few years ago. Most of these investments in foresight are made for under $100 million, many for less than $10 million.
More important than the revenue (if any) that these acquired companies can generate, the ideas they bring shape or reshape businesses in their parent companies in ways that arenât always immediately obvious. Yahoo!, for example, likely bought tagging pioneer de.lic.ious for what it could do for Yahoo!âs search service rather than for the potential for building a business around a social tagging site. Unfortunately, the occasional, wildly overpriced, âhow does this fitâ deal like eBayâs $2.4 billion acquisition of VoIP provider Skype gets most of the press and sets the wrong example.
Google is buying many young emerging technology companies even before they get much if any venture funding, 12 since 2003 and 5 in the last 6 months. As important as the business ideas and concepts that these young companies bring is the skill and foresight of the founding employees.
And what of twin telecom titans â Verizon and SBC (just retro-rebranded as âat&tâ)? In their recent M&A activity, these goliaths appear to operate with blind spots more so than with any particular foresight.
Where have they spent their strategic capital in the last few years? Mega acquisitions (Verizon/MCI, SBC/AT&T, Sprint/Nextel) to build up their positions with business customers. Acquisitions of companies having licenses that will fill out wireless coverage. And, major infrastructure investments in both their wireless (e.g. EVDO, HSPDA) and wireline (e.g. FIOS) infrastructure to be able to sell more music and video content in competition with entertainment and cable companies.
Verizon Communications, for example, acquired MCI for $8.6 billion in 2005 and spent $1.2 billion on acquisitions in 2004, nearly 90% of which went to purchasing or making investments in some 13 companies that held wireless licenses that benefit its Verizon Wireless unit. The company did another 16 of these deals in 2005. Starting in 2004 and for a number of years, they will spend billions more to build out their FTTP (fiber to the premises) and EVDO (broadband wireless) infrastructure.
Itâs hard to argue with these telco titan strategies. Most of them (MCI, license acquisitions, FTTP) are bold yet competitively defensive. At the same time, it appears the enormous amount of management attention spent on this agenda may be limiting their senior executives’ ability to take control of the convergence future and their company’s role in it.
Infrastructure companies like Verizon and SBC havenât believed theyâve needed to own the content going over their networks, just to control it. Comcast, when it made a bid for Disney, felt otherwise. TimeWarnerAOL has failed to create increased value out of its combination of infrastructure, content and online assets, assembled in part through acquisition.
So, the jury is still out on the right future strategy for infrastructure dominated companies in a converged world. The right strategy doesnât appear to be in play right now. Certainly, the apparent unwillingness of most of these titans to show foresight by purchasing young companies (and the titan’s own limited record of innovation) suggests a significant blind spot.
Interestingly, there are many young content software management companies working closely with the telco and cable titans right now to distribute music and video from the titanâs walled gardens. Unfortunately, the key discussions between these titans and young pups are usually around how big a piece of the pie the titan will allow the upstart to take rather than how to increase the size and number of pies through innovative adoption and scaling of the upstartâs concept and addition of entrepreneurial DNA.
The acquisition pace is expected to pick up this year, in number if not in dollars, as the technology, communications and media businesses continue to converge and search for new business models and ways to create value. The opportunity for the telecom and cable companies to adopt the foresighted approach of some of their technology and media competitors is right there in front of them to act on.


